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This work offers 18 ground-breaking articles, written by an international group of philosophers, on companion animal ethics. It explores the ethical foundations of our relationships with pets, in particular dogs and cats, and specific moral issues, including breeding, reproduction, sterilization, cloning, adoption, feeding, training, working, sexual interactions, longevity, dying, and euthanasia

In Ethics and Human Reproduction, Christine Overall blends feminist theory and philosophical expertise to provide a coherent analysis of a range of moral questions and social policy issues pertaining to human reproduction and the new reproductive technologies. Topics covered include: sex preselection, artificial insemination, prenatal diagnosis, abortion, in vitro fertilisation and embryo transfer, surrogate motherhood, and childbirth. Throughout the book, the author examines the values and assumptions underlying common perceptions of sexuality and fertility, the status of the foetus, the valu

As a vegetarian for several decades, Sue Hendler had a criterion for what could and could not be consumed: "Never eat anything that has a face." Indeed, she once chided me, on those grounds, for eating shrimps. Her criterion exemplifies two important aspects of ethical decision-making. First, what ought to be done or not done depends upon what entities one is dealing with and deciding about. In other words, good ethics depends upon sound metaphysics; moral decision-making is, in part, a function of one's ontology. Second, what something is (its ontology) to us as human beings—for example, a "being with a face"—partly depends upon how we relate to it, because how we relate to something makes some of its characteristics more salient than others, and even (in some cases) creates those characteristics. In other words, ontological identity is, in part, relational, and relating and relationships are core contributors to good ethical reasoning. This paper explores and elaborates upon these two fundamental claims, and shows how Sue Hendler supported these ideas in her life and in her work as a feminist planner.

After a brief discussion of the terms "monogamy" and "nonmonogamy," I evaluate explanations offered by different theorists for the pain that nonmonogamy can cause to the partner (especially a female partner) of a nonmonogamous person (of either sex). My suggestion is that the self, especially the female self, is convention' ally defined in terms of sexual partners. I present and reply to a possible objection to this explanation, and then discuss my theory's normative implications.